The Berlin Crisis of 1961; Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June-November 1961 de Slusser, Robert M - 1973

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Paperback. Fair. xvi, [2], 509, [1] pages. Glossary. List of Works Cited. Abbreviations of Works Most Frequently Cited. Subject Index. Name Index. Marks and highlighting noted to text. This book uses the Berlin Crisis of 1961 as a starting point to investigate Soviet-American relations in the Kruschev period. The book first chronicles the timeline of the succession of events during the Berlin Crisis and their interrelation. It then turns to the close interaction between Soviet and foreign policy before situating the event into the broader timeline of Soviet history. Robert M. Slusser was a distinguished scholar of Russian history. Born May 14, 1916, Slusser was educated at the University of Chicago (A.B., 1941) and Columbia University (M.A., 1960 and Ph.D., 1963). He taught at Johns Hopkins and Columbia University before coming to Michigan State University in 1970. He retired from MSU some time in the mid-1980s. Slusser's particular area of expertise was modern Russian history. In particular, he devoted much of his research to Soviet foreign policy and to the study of the Soviet secret police. Slusser wrote many books and articles on these areas of Russian history. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 was the last major European political and military incident of the Cold War concerning the status of the German capital city, Berlin, and of post-World War II Germany. The crisis culminated in the city's de facto partition with the East German construction of the Berlin Wall. The Berlin Crisis began in June 1961 when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, meeting with US President John F. Kennedy at the Vienna summit, reissued an ultimatum which demanded the withdrawal of all armed forces from Berlin, including the Western armed forces in West Berlin. The East German government also sought a way to stop its "brain drain" as its population fled west through Berlin, made possible by the city's four-power status and the allowance of free travel. No agreement was reached and in August 1961, with Khrushchev's backing, East German leader Walter Ulbricht ordered the closing of the border and the construction of a wall around West Berlin. A brief stand-off between American and Soviet tanks occurred at Checkpoint Charlie in October following a dispute over free movement of Allied personnel; the confrontation ended peacefully after Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed to withdraw the tanks and reduce tensions. With GRU spy Georgi Bolshakov serving as the primary channel of communication, Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed to reduce tensions by withdrawing the tanks. The Soviet checkpoint had direct communications to General Anatoly Gribkov at the Soviet Army High Command, who in turn was on the phone to Khrushchev. The US checkpoint contained a Military Police officer on the telephone to the HQ of the US Military Mission in Berlin, which in turn was in communication with the White House. Kennedy offered to go easy over Berlin in the future in return for the Soviets removing their tanks first. The Soviets agreed. Kennedy stated concerning the Wall: "It's not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war." A Soviet tank moved about 5 meters backwards first; then an American tank followed suit. One by one the tanks withdrew. But General Bruce C. Clarke, then the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of US Army Europe (USAREUR), was said to have been concerned about General Clay's conduct and Clay returned to the United States in May 1962. Gen. Clarke's assessment may have been incomplete, however: Clay's firmness had a great effect on the German population, led by West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.