The Bomb and the Computer: Wargaming from Ancient Chinese Mapboard to Atomic Computer

New York: Delacorte Press, 1968. First Printing. very good, fair to good. xv, [3], 218 pages. Figures. Index of Names. Index of Games. DJ worn along edges and slightly soiled, small piece missing at DJ spine. Andrew Wilson's 1968 book was the first to describe for the general reader the evolution of the war game as a serious, and sometimes unreliable, military planning tool. The author was the Defence Correspondent to The Observer Newspaper. He was granted special access to the Pentagon and other secret sources of information and interviewed many leading experts on policy-making on both sides of the Atlantic. The result was an authoritative and readable work on the subject that was directly related to the precarious balance of power in the Cold War. The book demonstrates how crucial war games were in American weapon development, foreign policy and war fighting plans during the dark days of the Cold War. The evolution of the war game as a serious, and often unreliable, military planning device, written for the general reader. Military simulations, also known informally as war games, are simulations in which theories of warfare can be tested and refined without the need for actual hostilities. Many professional analysts object to the term wargames as this is generally taken to be referring to the civilian hobby, thus the preference for the term simulation.

Simulations exist in many different forms, with varying degrees of realism. In recent times, the scope of simulations has widened to include not only military but also political and social factors, which are seen as inextricably entwined in a realistic warfare model.

Whilst many governments make use of simulation, both individually and collaboratively, little is known about it outside professional circles. Yet modelling is often the means by which governments test and refine their military and political policies. Military simulations are seen as a useful way to develop tactical, strategical and doctrinal solutions, but critics argue that the conclusions drawn from such models are inherently flawed, due to the approximate nature of the models used.