Chemical-Biological Defense; U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War

Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998. First Paperback Printing [Stated]. Trade paperback. Very good. Joseph DePinho (Cover Design). xxii, [2], 236, [6] pages. Foreword by Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, U.S. Army (Ret.). Glossary. Notes. Selected Bibliography. Index. Al Mauroni is the Director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base. He oversees education and research on issues related to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons at the Air University. He has more than 30 years experience in DoD countering weapons of mass destruction policy and program development. He has developed and coordinated joint concepts, strategic plans, information papers, budget analyses, and related briefings within the areas of passive defense, consequence management, and homeland defense/civil support. Over his career, he has worked C-WMD issues for the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has included supporting the initial stand-up and management of the DoD Chemical-Biological Defense Program; supporting counterproliferation policy and budget analysis for the Joint Staff J5 and J8; establishing the Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense; and modernizing Air Force C-WMD capabilities. For an appropriately trained and equipped military force, chemical weapons pose the threat of mass disruption. This book will reveal a coordinated response to train and equip U.S. forces did take place prior to the feared Iraqi chemical and biological attacks. Undocumented in any other book, it details the plans that rushed sixty Fox reconnaissance vehicles to the Gulf, the worldwide call for protective suits and masks, and the successful placement of biological agent detectors prior to the air offensive. In addition, the work addresses what really happened at Khamisiyah. Were troops exposed to chemical weapons and what is behind the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome? The Gulf War has been the only conflict in the last half-century that featured the possible use of chemical-biological weapons against U.S. forces. Vulnerability to such an attack spurred the Department of Defense to action from the first hint of trouble in August 1990 through the end of hostilities in March 1991. Focussing on the work of senior Army officials, this account assesses the degree of readiness achieved by the ground war's initiation and the lessons learned since the conflict.