Defence of the West

New York: William Morrow & Co, 1950. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. Good/Fair. [2], x, 335, [5] pages. Occasional footnotes. Index. DJ worn, torn, soiled and chipped. Book is slightly cocked. Some page discoloration and soiling. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (31 October 1895 - 29 January 1970), commonly known throughout most of his career as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, was a British soldier, military historian and military theorist. He wrote a series of military histories that proved influential among strategists. Arguing that frontal assault was bound to fail at great cost in lives, as proven in the First World War, he recommended the "indirect approach" and reliance on fast-moving armored formations. His pre-war publications are known to have influenced German World War II strategy. He worked as the military correspondent of The Times from 1935 to 1939. In the mid-to-late 1920s Liddell Hart wrote a series of histories of major military figures through which he advanced his ideas that the frontal assault was a strategy bound to fail at great cost in lives. He argued that the losses Britain suffered in the Great War were caused by its commanding officers not appreciating that fact of history. He believed the British decision in 1914 of intervening on the Continent with a great army was a mistake. He claimed that historically, "the British way in warfare" was to leave Continental land battles to her allies, intervening only through naval power, with the army fighting the enemy away from its principal front in a "limited liability" commitment. In his early writings on mechanized warfare, Liddell Hart had proposed that infantry be carried along with the fast-moving armored formations. Liddell Hart foresaw the need for a combined arms force with mobile infantry and artillery, which was similar but not identical to the make-up of the panzer divisions that Heinz Guderian developed in Germany. According to Liddell Hart's memoirs, in a series of articles for The Times from November 1935 to November 1936, he had argued that Britain's role in the next European war should be entrusted to the air force. The ideas influenced Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, who argued in discussions of the Defence Policy and Requirements Committee for a strong air force, rather than a large army that would fight on the Continent. Becoming prime minister in 1937, Chamberlain placed Liddell Hart in a position of influence behind British grand strategy in the late 1930s. Liddell Hart gained an introduction to the Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha. Through July 1938 the two had an unofficial, close advisory relationship. Liddell Hart provided Hore-Belisha with ideas, which he would argue for in Cabinet or committees. On 20 October 1937, Chamberlain wrote to Hore-Belisha, "I have been reading in Europe in Arms by Liddell Hart. If you have not already done so you might find it interesting to glance at this, especially the chapter on the 'Role of the British Army'". Hore-Belisha wrote in reply: "I immediately read the 'Role of the British Army' in Liddell Hart's book. I am impressed by his general theories". Derived from a Kirkus review: A serious, well-informed military analyst and historian considers the military situation of Western Europe, with appraisals and recommendations for its defence in a war with Russia. The book falls into five parts. Part I deals with blunders of the last war, French military orthodoxy leading up to the 1940 collapse, failure to clean up in Africa in 1941 (much of this based on interviews with German generals), Germany's lack of tank transport in Russia, the policy of unconditional surrender and fostering resistance movements...Part II, titled "Tomorrow"", considers the next war, and here the author recommends a minimum land force to check the Russian spearheads, with preponderant effort concentrated on air strength. Part III surveys Russia's forces today, and describes the unused airborne forces as the "ace up Stalin's sleeve". Part IV considers unification, the future of armored forces, conscription, and the Army reorganized for greater flexibility. Finally, Part V reviews such problems as an international police force, disarmament, and limitations of war. Dated by the swift passage of history with the Korean War, nonetheless there are enough basic issues to make it of interest to the armchair strategist.