Doctrine and Dogma; German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War

New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. First Printing [Stated]. Hardcover. Very good. xiii, [1], 225, [1] pages. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. No DJ present. This is Greenwood's Contributions in Military Studies, Number 121. Martin secured his M. Phil. and Ph.D. in Military Studies from the University of Manchester. Having focused his energies on a career in the UK public service, he returned to his field of research in 2011, balancing writing with his role as a Strategic Director for a large English city council. The intention of this work is to make clear the foundations upon which the German tactics of the First World War were based and to contrast this with the British system. Such an analysis may provide a guide towards a deeper understanding of the current situation and may allow the British Army to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. This is the first in-depth comparison of German and British infantry tactics, training, and leadership techniques during World War I. Samuels' study undercuts some traditional views about the reasons for German successes and British failures during the Great War and points to how different value systems in the two countries affected their military prowess. This historical study of the doctrines underlying the British and German strategies and their implementation is intended for students of military history and contemporary military strategy.
This history first analyzes the development of German infantry tactics and the role of the Storm Battalions and then examines the British attempt to adopt the German defensive systems and points to reasons for flaws in the British doing so. In comparing and contrasting the British and German armies, Samuels outlines the key concepts on which the German defensive system was based and analyzes how forces were trained and leadership was decentralized to produce a dynamic and flexible system. British efforts to adopt the key concepts failed because leadership was centralized and poor training contributed also to combat ineffectiveness.