The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940

Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997. First Edition. First Printing. very good, very good. 378, illus., notes, bibliography, index. A superb example of both military and intellectual history, Corum's study provides the most complete and accurate account of the evolution of German military aviation theory, doctrine, war games, and operations between the two world wars. It reveals how the Germans, in defiance of Versailles, thoroughly studied and tested the lessons of World War I, analyzed the emerging air doctrines of other nations, and experimented with innovative aviation technology to create the world's most powerful air force by 1940. Drawing heavily upon archival sources, Corum discloses the debates within the General Staff--led by the likes of Hans van Seeckt, Helmuth Wilberg, Wolfram von Richthofen, and Walter Wever--about the future role of airpower and the problems of aligning aviation technology with air doctrine. Challenging previous accounts, he demolishes a number of myths. He demonstrates, for example, that Germany did not dismiss the potential ofstrategic bombing, did not embrace "terror bombing" of civilian populations, and was not heavily infuenced by its popular culture's romancewith aviation.