To Spy or Not to Spy

Chula Vista, CA: Pateo Publishing Co, 1985. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Trade paperback. Good. [2], vi, [1], vii-xiii, 199, [1] pages. Decorative front cover. Author photograph on back cover. Date received and previous owner's name (John M. Quesenberry) and address stamped on rear cover. Author inscription reads: "6/6/86 John Q: Thanks for your order. Hope you like the book. Elliott "Okie" See page 187".[mark on page--Quesenberry mentioned]. Dedication. Preface by the author. Foreword. Excerpts from "All Hands Magazine" October 1983. ORTG Memorial. The author, retired Lieutenant Commander, USN, had more than two decades of work in Naval intelligence. In 1928 the CNO announced the Navy's intention to formally train enlisted sailors and Marines in RI operations. At the time of this announcement, Harry Kidder was not only the best operator in the fleet, he also was local. He had been transferred to the Navy's main communications station in Washington, D.C., for regular radioman (RM) duties. Kidder was selected to teach the first RI training class to ten hand-selected RMs. A steel-reinforced concrete classroom was constructed on the roof of the sixth wing of Main Navy building as a classroom for the new RI training, giving these cryptologic pioneers their name. The classroom was designed to accommodate eight students and the radio intercept equipment necessary to conduct the training. The training began with an overview of RI concepts, followed by an introduction into the IJN organization, order of battle, and communications procedures. The students were taught the Japanese alphabet, both katakana and the westernized Romaji, as well as Japanese katakana telegraphic code. Following the initial offering of the training, approximately two On-The-Roof Gang classes graduated each year, with each class consisting of three to ten radio operators. By October 1941, a total of 150 sailors and 26 Marines in 25 classes attended this new RI training on the roof of the Main Navy building. During the years of the On-The-Roof Gang training, tensions between the United States and Japan had continued to grow, and graduates were assigned to radio intercept sites around the Pacific. The eight graduates of Class #1 were sent to Station BAKER in 1929 to establish the radio intercept site there. Subsequent graduates were assigned to Station ABLE in China, Station HYPO in Hawaii, and the Station CAST in the Philippines, where they monitored the communications of Japanese ships at sea and shore stations. The reports prepared by personnel at these sites demonstrated both the tactical and strategic value of RI. Not only did these reports reflect the Japanese fleet's strategic capability to wage a comprehensive naval war against the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, but they also revealed Japan's intentions to invade Manchuria, to defend the western Pacific in case of a U.S. attempt to interfere, and to conduct electronic countermeasures in the event the United States attempted to monitor fleet communications. The intelligence gained through the intercept by the On-The-Roof Gang proved invaluable and was often the only source of information by which USN commanders had to make decisions. Navy cryptanalysts at Station HYPO and OP-20-G made a breakthrough in the decryption of JN-25B in February 1942 and began to partially decrypt Japanese messages. It was clear to the On-The-Roof Gang intercept operators and analysts that the Japanese were preparing for operations near the U.S. base of Port Moresby. With decrypted and translated messages along with traffic analysis, the U.S. Navy was able to accurately determine the attacking force size, location, and composition. As the Battle of Coral Sea began, U.S. Navy warships were on station, ready for battle, in locations queued to them through RI. In exercising their new RI skills, the On-The-Roof Gang intercept operators became so skilled at their jobs, they began to recognize the Japanese radio operators' "fists." Each Japanese radio operator tapped out their code on their CW key with their own slight idiosyncrasies and skilled intercept operators could discern one radio operator from another. On-The-Roof Gang operators, both at sea and ashore, participated in the victories in the Solomon Islands, Guadalcanal, Marianas Islands, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and more. They provided intelligence throughout the island-hopping campaign and the attrition of Japan. Radio intelligence had grown into an indispensable asset during World War II, and the 176 sailors and Marines that received the On-The-Roof Gang became the deckplate pioneers of modern naval cryptology and the predecessors of today's U.S. Tenth Fleet.