Three Mile Island; A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective

Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. First Printing [Stated]. Hardcover. Very good. xi, [1], 303, [5] pages. Illustrations. List of Illustrations. Notes. Essay on Sources. Index. Inscription signed and dated by the author on title page. Cover has slight wear and soiling. J. Samuel Walker is an American historian and author based in Maryland, most notable for his research and writing on the nuclear age, both weaponry and atomic energy. Several of his books have earned broad-based critical acclaim and advanced novel viewpoints. Despite affiliation with government and the nuclear industry, he is cited by the peace movement and parties who are highly critical of nuclear energy. Walker was a history instructor at the University of Maryland in the mid-seventies but was hired by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in June, 1979, working under the chief historian, George T. Mazuzan. Walker was able to write in a lucid manner applauded in popular science press. He also authored a comprehensive review of the Three Mile Island accident, Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective (2004). According to his own account, Walker's work debunked the "grievous misconstructions [which] were portrayals of the bubble issue that were central features of at least two books that came out shortly after the accident (in 1982) and in three television programs..." Walker disputed the alleged imminence of an explosion; a central point of his argument was that if the situation was as dangerous as previous writers contended, that Jimmy Carter would not have been permitted to visit the TMI power plant. Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station consisted of two pressurized water reactors manufactured by Babcock & Wilcox. TMI-2, which suffered a partial meltdown, is in the background. Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective is a scholarly history of the Three Mile Island accident, written by J. Samuel Walker and published in 2004. Walker is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's historian and his book is the first detailed historical analysis since the accident. The 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station in Pennsylvania was "the single most important event in the fifty-year history of nuclear power regulation in the United States", according to Walker. Many commentators have seen the event as a turning point for the nuclear power industry in the United States. Three Mile Island is J. Samuel Walker's fourth book as the official historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In the book's preface, Walker tells readers that he had complete independence in its authorship-that the NRC placed no restrictions on what could be said. The main part of the book consists of six chapters, with a chapter covering each of the five days (Wednesday, March 28, 1979, to Sunday, April 1, 1979) of the crisis stage of the accident and another chapter covering its immediate effects. Walker draws on a wide range of sources, but mainly on the report of the Kemeny Commission, which President Carter appointed immediately after the accident, and the Rogovin Report, which resulted from the NRC's own inquiry. In the end, the Three Mile Island accident, though it "caused a grave crisis, did not produce a public health disaster". The pressure vessel held when faced with a core meltdown and there was no breach of the power plant's containment structure. It took 11 years to clean up TMI-2 and this cost about US$1 billion. Walker suggests that the TMI accident incited widespread criticism of nuclear power technology, the nuclear industry, and the NRC. Critics faulted the industry and the NRC for their poor performance both before and after the accident. The international attention garnered by the crisis redoubled the determination of, and enhanced the credibility of, the anti-nuclear movement. Arguably, the United States nuclear industry has never recovered. Walker concludes that the TMI-2 accident left a mixed legacy. It did force regulatory and operational improvements on a reluctant industry, but it also increased opposition to nuclear power. In Walker's analysis, neither the critics nor proponents are completely vindicated. Anti-nuclear advocates were right: a nuclear accident was likely, and the industry was not prepared for it. But their predicted worst-case accident, called the "China Syndrome", did not eventuate. For its part, the industry said that it had reformed itself, but perhaps by then few were listening. In a review for New Scientist, Rob Edwards states that Walker provides a lucid account of the Three Mile Island accident, which is "riveting because of its detail". It gives a graphic insight into the chaos and confusion of the five-day crisis, and shows how the nuclear industry, the regulators and the government all "initially played down the risks, then had to eat their words". Edwards says a "catastrophe was avoided - but only by luck"