De Lingua Belief (Bradford Books) Tapa dura - 2006

Name: De Lingua Belief.
Price: 15.00 AUD
Availability: InStock
Author: Fiengo, Robert; May, Robert.
ISBN: 9780262062572

de Fiengo, Robert

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Información de la editorial

An investigation into the beliefs speakers have about language - their de lingua beliefs - that examines the genesis of these beliefs and the central explanatory role they play in the use and understanding of language.

Primera línea

Speakers, in the course of their conversations, use language to talk about language.

Detalles

Título De Lingua Belief (Bradford Books)
Autor Fiengo, Robert
Encuadernación Tapa dura
Edición 1st ed.
Editorial The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Fecha de publicación October 1, 2006
ISBN 9780262062572

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De Lingua Belief.

de Fiengo, Robert; May, Robert.

Usado
Tapa blanda
First

Estado

Usado

Edición

1st ed.

Encuadernación

Paperback

ISBN 10 / ISBN 13

9780262062572 / 0262062577

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Librería

Bookhome Sydney

Annandale, New South Wales, Australia

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Precio

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EUR 23.48 enviando a USA

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Descripción:

Cambridge, MA: Bradford / MIT Press, 2006. 1st ed.. Paperback octavo, good plus condition, prelim page removed, otherwise excellent condition. 179 pp. De lingua beliefs are those about everyday conversations, when we examine the language we use. We wonder about what words mean, to whom a name refers, whether a sentence is true. The focus of this book is on the beliefs we have about the semantic values of linguistic expressions, exploring the genesis of these beliefs, and how they explain how we use and understand language. Examines the resources available to us for generating linguistic beliefs, and considers how linguistic theory characterizes the formal, syntactic identity of the linguistic beliefs. The key insight is that the content of beliefs about semantic values is part of what we say by our utterances. This has direct consequences for explaining the information in identity statements, and the possibilities for substitution in attributions of propositional attitudes.