Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi's Memoirs, 1967-1971 Tapa dura - 2014

Descripción de contraportada

The memoirs of Gen. Mohamed Fawzi, Egyptian War Minister from 1967 to 1971, were first published in 1984, but his work has not been translated from Arabic and remains undiscovered by most English speaking readers. Many in the U.S. armed services have yet to be introduced to his ideas, perspectives, and the tactical, operational and strategic seeds by which the 1973 Yom-Kippur War were sown. In this new contribution to his series of essays originally written for the U.S. Army's Infantry Journal, Aboul-Enein is determined to bring to life the military thoughts of this Arab war minister as part of his mission to introduce America's military leaders to Arabic works of military significance.

Sun Tzu admonishes his readers to know their enemies, and Aboul-Enein (an American naval officer and established scholar whose personal and professional background gives him a unique vantage point) makes a significant contribution to that aim through this and his previous works. Fawzi is unique among Arab generals for his scathing critique of his own armed forces, and from his critical examination of what went wrong in 1967 he was able to bring the Egyptian armed forces back to a level that enabled Sadat to consider an offensive in 1973. Fawzi provides insights into the level of Soviet cooperation and military aid provided to Egypt after the 1967 Six-Day War, known simply in Arabic as al-Naksah (the setback), not to be confused with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War known as al-Nakbah (the catastrophe). Despite occasional lapses into conspiracy theories, wishful thinking, and the language of pan-Arabism, Fawzi's work is an astute analysis of the lessons learned from Egypt's crushing defeat in the Six-Day War. This book is a warning never to underestimate a defeated army's intellectual ability to innovate new tactics and strategies, leading to a resumption of conflict.